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Companies  generate  financial  statements  that  are  used  for  decision  making  by  various 
stakeholders  and  the  quality of those  financial  statements  depends  on the  quality  of the 
external  auditor.  There exists  empirical evidence  of quality differentiation  between audit 
firms, but the audit-quality proxy that is typically used, auditor size (big 6 I non-big 6 fum), 
is very rough. The major purpose and contribution of this paper is to further investigate audit-
quality determinants empirically. To that end we test the impact on financial statement and 
audit  quality  of audit-firm  portfolio  characteristics,  that  we  selected  based  on  a  well-
perceived  theory  by  DeAngelo  (1981).  We  indeed  find  that  audit-firm.  portfolio 
characteristics better explain variations in financial statement and audit quality. In particular: 
1) the short-term leverage of an audit fum's portfolio is negatively, and 2) the number of 
clients in an audit firm's portfolio is positively associated with financial statement and audit 
quality. 
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Reliable  information  is  crucial  for  sound  economic  decision  making.  Companies 
typically  generate  and  report  information  about  their  business  activities.  This 
information is used for decision making by company stakeholders, such as investors, 
creditors,  suppliers,  employees,  regulators,  tax  authorities  and  competitors.  A 
company's financial statements are an important subset of such company information. 
To safeguard the quality, reliability and consistency of financial  statements various 
corporate governance mechanisms can be installed in firms. The external, independent 
audit of the financial statements is one such mechanism. However, the value of such 
an audit depends on the quality of the audit firm that executes the audit engagement. 
Audit quality is thus crucial for financial statement quality, but is intangible 
and  hence  difficult  to  measure.  A  widespread  used  definition  of audit  quality  is 
provided  by  DeAngelo  (1981)  and  is  the  consumers'  perception  of  the  joint 
probability that an auditor (a) discovers a breach in the client's accounting system and 
(b) reports that breach. This definition contains two important aspects, namely: auditor 
competence and independence. In the auditing literature little attention has been paid 
to  the  empirical  assessment  of determinants  audit  qUality.  One  surrogate  that  is 
frequently used is audit-firm size, which is typically measured by the dichotomous big 
6 I non-big 6 variable (Colbert and Murray 1998). Theories have been put forward to 
underpin the positive relationship between audit-firm size and audit qUality. DeAngelo 
(1981)  relates  audit quality to  auditor size  based on  auditor-reputation effects.  As 
reputation damage might result in loss of clients or reduced future audit fees, auditors 
will  want  to  avoid  bad  publicity  regarding  their  services.  As  large  audit  firms 
2 (measured by the total number of clients) stand to lose more, DeAngelo hypothesises 
that those firms  will  have  a  greater incentive to  maintain  a  certain level of audit 
quality, as compared to small audit firms. Dye (1993) adds to the work of DeAngelo 
and focuses on the wealth. that is at stake when an audit firm is subject to litigation. He 
argues that large audit firms are inclined to supply a higher quality compared to small 
firms, as more wealth is at stake in large audit firms. 
Most  empirical  work  on  audit  quality  focuses  on  the  implications  of 
differentiated audit quality and audit-firm size is typically used as a measure of quality 
differentiation. Examples of such implications include: 1) Differences between big 6 
and other firms  as  to audit fees charged, with higher fees for big 6  firms (see, for 
example,  Simunic  1980;  Palmrose  1986a,b;  Francis  and  Simon  1987;  Gist  1992; 
Craswell et al. 1995),2) Differences between big 6 and other firms as to audit reports 
issued,  with more qualifications  issued by big 6  ftrms  (Citron  and Taffler 1992; 
Mutchler 1996; Gaeremynck and Willekens 2001), 3) Differences between clients of 
big 6 and other firms as to earnings management, with big 6 clients engaging less in 
earnings  management  (Becker  et  al.  1998;  Vander  Bauwhede  et  al.  2001);  4) 
Differences  between clients  of big 6  and other firms  as  to management earnings 
forecasts, with big 6 audit firms being associated with larger error forecasts (Davidson 
and Neu 1993); 5) Differences between clients of big 6 and other firms as to pricing 
by the capital markets, with higher earnings response coefficients for big 6  clients 
(Teoh and Wong 1993) and smaller amount of underpricing at the time of an IPO 
when the financial statements are verifted by a big 6 auditor (Beatty 1989; Balvers et 
al. 1988). We are unaware of a study that aims at empirically addressing audit quality 
determinants as such. 
3 Given the importance of the external audit function in the economy, the major 
purpose  and  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  further  investigate  audit-quality 
determinants empirically.  To that end we link:  audit quality to  financial  statement 
quality, and define a client's compliance (or not) with a new accounting regulation as 
our measure of financial  statement quality.  The audit-quality (and hence financial 
statement quality) determinants that we propose to test are all characteristics of the 
client portfolio of the audit firm. like the traditionally tested auditor-size (big 61 non-
big 6) variable, they are  also  based on the reputation theory in DeAngelo (1981). 
However, audit-firm portfolio characteristics are finer than the auditor-size variable as 
they  measure  both  1)  the  probability of reputation  damage  and 2)  the  monetary 
consequences.  As  the  number  of viable  portfolio  variables  is  rather  large,  we 
performed a factor analysis to select a reduced set of representative variables. This 
resulted in five factors/dimensions within the portfolio variables, namely: profitability, 
liquidity, leverage, visibility and volume. Finally, we performed a multivariate logistic 
regression  analysis  to  test  whether  and  which  audit-firm  portfolio  characteristics 
explain differences in financial reporting behavior of the auditor's clients. The results 
from  the  analysis  show  that  audit-firm  portfolio  characteristics  better  explain 
differences in financial statement qUality than the traditionally used big 61 non-big 6 
variable. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section we 
develop our hypotheses. In Section 3 we clarify our measure of financial statement 
quality.  Next, we define the audit-firm portfolio measures and report on the factor 
analysis we applied. In Section 5, we specify the logistic regression model that we 
4 used to test the hypotheses. We then comment on the sample selection procedure that 
we adopted in Section 6.  A discussion of our results follows in Section 7, and in the 
final section we provide a brief summary. 
2. HYPOTHESES 
Managers have incentives to report in ways that are in their best self-interest, even at 
the expense of the firm's owners (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Some examples are: 
aggressive financial reporting, not revealing value relevant information, and too late 
or not applying new accounting standards. One of the responsibilities of an  auditor 
consists in counteracting this opportunistic reporting behavior, thereby improving the 
quality of the financial statements. The main research question in our paper is whether 
audit quality is affected by the audit firm's portfolio characteristics. 
As suggested by DeAngelo (1981) and Dye (1993), an audit firm is induced to 
exercise more audit effort and consequently supply higher audit quality the bigger its 
concern to safeguard its reputation and avoid litigation. The future of an audit firm is 
jeopardised by potential damage resulting from insufficient or inappropriate reporting 
practices adopted by clients. Further, public criticism on an audit firm's practices may 
also considerably lower the public's confidence in that firm and damage its reputation. 
The expected  reputation  damage  associated  with  below-standard  audit  quality  is 
affected by two factors:  1) the probability of occurrence of reputation damage and 2) 
the monetary consequences of reputation damage. 
Expected Reputation Damage =  P(Reputation Damage) * Monetary Consequences of 
a reputation damage 
5 We  argue  that  the  probability  of reputation  damage  is  affected  by the financial 
performance of all clients in the portfolio of an auditor. First, because it is reasonable 
to expect that client financial performance influences  the  likelihood of reputation 
damage.  According  to  a  recent  study  by  Lennox  (1999)  based  on  articles  in the 
financial press, audit firms receive most criticism for not giving adequate warnings of 
bankruptcy. It is also a fact that most litigation is associated with audit clients that 
experience fmancial distress. Second, it is obvious that the financial performance of 
all firms in the portfolio matters. Even if the performance of some client is excellent, 
the weak performance of another client followed by reputation damage (for example 
press articles, stakeholders' lawsuits) can influence the relationship between the audit 
firm and the other clients in the portfolio (for example no renewal of the audit term). 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS  1: As the portfolio of  an auditor is financially weaker,  the auditor will 
supply higher audit quality, which in tum results in higher  financial statement quality 
(FSQ). 
However,  not only the probability but also the potential monetary consequences of 
reputation damage will influence auditor behavior. This reputation cost depends on 
the exposure an audit firm faces.  The size of reputation damage is also affected by 
some characteristics of the audit portfolio, such as the number of clients, the size of 
the  clients and the  visibility of the client (attention by the different stakeholders). 
Audit firms with a larger clientele and/or that charge relatively large audit fees stand 
to  lose more  and  will  thus  perceive  a  greater threat from reputation damage  (De 
Angelo 1981). This results in the following hypothesis: 
6 HYPOTHESIS 2: As the portfolio of  an auditor contains more, larger and highly visible 
clients, the auditor will supply higher audit quality, which results in higher financial 
statement quality (FSQ). 
3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FINANCIAL STATEMENT QUALITY 
As audit quality is intangible, we are linking it to a measure of financial statement 
quality that is clearly affected by it. Our measure of financial statement quality is an 
audit client's compliance  with  a  new  accounting  regulation  that  was  imposed in 
Belgium in 1997. In that year Belgian bankruptcy legislation, which dated from 1951, 
was amended. Apart from changes made to prescribed bankruptcy procedures, a new 
paragraph was added to the Company Law. This paragraph imposes a new reporting 
requirement for firms that are 'in difficulties'. The law defines  'firms in difficulties' 
as  firms  that report either a loss  in  the income statement during two consecutive 
financial years or a negative retained earnings figure on the balance sheet. When one 
of these situations holds, the company's Board of Directors is required to disclose 
whether it continues to adopt a going-concern valuation basis for the company, or 
whether it chooses to adopt a liquidation basis for valuation. Further, if the first option 
is chosen the Board is obliged to give a motivation why a going concern perspective is 
maintained. The financial reporting decisions the Board (or management) takes and 
the possible interactions with the external auditor are presented chronologically in 
Figure 1. First, if a firm faces financial problems, managers have to decide whether to 
continue  operations.  If the  decision  is  liquidation,  then  the  accounting  standards 
7 prescribe that every item in the balance sheet is valued at its realisable value. The new 
standard does not apply to  companies that make this  choice. If the  decision is  to 
continue  operations,  the  new  standard does  apply  and  management's  decision  is 
whether to disclose the required information or not. If  the decision is non-disclosure, 
the auditor can influence the reporting process and demand disclosure, but in the end 
it is still management that decides whether or not the valuation basis is justified.  For 
the purpose of this paper, we consider financial statement quality as high, if an audit 
client in difficulties that chose the going-concern valuation method, complies with the 
new requirement and provides a motivation for its valuation choice in the notes. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
4. SELECTION AND FACTOR ANALYSIS OF AUDIT-FIRM PORTFOLIO 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The independent variables in this paper include audit-firm portfolio characteristics. 
We  gathered two types  of audit-firm portfolio  variables:  1)  variables  that capture 
financial health characteristics of the aggregate audit-fmn portfolio (see Hypothesis 
1), and 2) variables that have an impact on the monetary consequences of reputation 
damage  (see  Hypothesis  2).  To  measure  audit-firm  portfolio  characteristics,  we 
selected  all  client  firms  from  the  Belgian  National  Bank  (BNB)  database  that 
appointed a  statutory auditor in 1997. We then identified the audit firms in which 
these statutory auditors were active by inspecting the membership lists published by 
the Belgian Institute of Auditors. We found that 165 different audit firms were active 
in the Belgian statutory audit market in 1997 and together audited 15450 client firms. 
8 We then selected the financial statements of these 15450 client-firms from the BNB-
database, and used them to compute our audit-fmn portfolio measures. 
As to the first  set of audit-firm portfolio variables,  namely those capturing 
financial  health  characteristics,  we  selected  financial  ratios  measuring  liquidity, 
profitability  and  solvency  aspects  of the  portfolio in line  with  prior literature  on 
bankruptcy  prediction  (see,  for  example,  Altman  1968;  Ohlson  1980;  Zmijewski 
1984; Hopwood et al. 1994; Kane et al. 1998). An overview of the selected variables 
can be found  in Table  1.  They are  used  to  explain the  cross-sectional  variances 
between audit firms as to the average financial health of the clients in the portfolio. 
We measured each of ratios  as  follows:  for each audit  firm, j, we  computed the 
median value of all individual client ratios. We preferred the median above the mean, 
as it better neutralises the impact of outliers. 
As to the second set of audit-firm portfolio variables, we introduced several 
determinants of potential monetary consequences of reputation damage. An overview 
of all these variables can also be  found in Table  1.  We  argue that reputation cost 
depends on the number as well as  on the size and the visibility of the clients in an 
auditor's portfolio. First, assuming that each client in a portfolio has the same impact 
on  an  audit firm's  reputation,  we  expect that the  number of clients  is  positively 
associated with the size of the reputation cost. Second, we also expect that the size of 
the clients in the portfolio is important, as  a larger amount of audit fees is lost with 
larger clients should reputation be damaged. Therefore we also include two frequently 
used size-measures: the median value of total assets and the number of employees per 
client in the audit-fmn portfolio. Third, we also include a variable that captures both 
9 the size and the number of clients in one, namely, the sum of all assets of the auditor's 
clients. Finally,  we  include a visibility measure, namely the relative percentage of 
audit clients with a works council. A works council is mandatory in Belgium in firms 
that count more than 100  employees, and in such frrms  the statutory auditor has the 
legal  duty  to  clarify  the  information  provided  in  the  financial  statements  to  the 
employees. When the auditor faces criticism in such frrms, unions will lose faith and 
the auditor will probably loose the appointment in this or other firms with a works 
council. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We applied a factor analysis, in particular, a principal components analysis to 
the 14 variables in Table 1. We did this for two purposes. First, to assess how many 
different  dimensions  of an  audit  finn's  portfolio  need  to  be  introduced  in  the 
subsequent regression analysis and hence to reduce the number of test variables. A 
large set of test variables could cause multicollinearity problems.  Second, to find an 
empirical confirmation for the assessed structure in our variables.  As stated in the 
hypotheses section, we believe that both a probability and a monetary dimension can 
be discerned. The factor pattern (loading) matrix is presented in Table 2. Using both 
the "eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule" and the Scree test, the number of factors is set 
to five. Overall, this five-factor solution accounts for 70 percent of the variance in the 
measures. The variables found to load 0.60 or higher on a factor are selected as  its 
domain.  There  is  no  evidence  of a  single,  general  factor  accounting  for  a  large 
percentage of the variations in the data. The level of item-variance for each factor, 
ranging from  18.4 to 8.27 percent, suggests that the five factors  are nearly equally 
10 important in evaluating a client portfolio. Elements of all five factors  will thus be 
introduced in the multivariate model developed in the next section. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We  named  each  of  the  five  factors  after  those  variables  that  loaded 
significantly on them and by examining their underlying common trait. As shown in 
Table 2, four variables load high on the first factor. All four have in common that they 
assess  the  profitability  of the  auditor's  clients,  either  in  the  past  (pAUTO  and 
PINDEP), the present (PROA) or both (PDIFFIC). Consequently, factor 1 is identified 
as the 'PROFlTABILITY' factor.  Table 2 also shows that only PCURRENT and 
PQUICK load highly under factor 2. These variables assess a  company's ability to 
meet its short-term financial obligations, and therefore are labelled 'LIQUIDITY'. 
Factor 5 is labelled 'LEVERAGE' because PCASH as well as PLEVERAGE have 
the highest loading on this factor. More specifically both variables consider the degree 
to which external financing is (or has been) necessary for respectively daily operations 
and investments.  The third factor,  identified as  the  'VISmILITY' of the firm,  is 
formed by PSIZE, PEMPLOY and PCOUNCn... Either the median size of clients, the 
number of employees  or the fact  of having a  works  council can thus be used to 
measure visibility.  Finally, factor 4  represents the magnitude or size of the client 
portfolio and was  called 'PORTFOLIO VOLUME'.  Note that factor  1, 2  and 5 
relate to the financial health (Hypothesis 1) while factor 3 and 4 capture the size of the 
reputation damage (Hypothesis 2). 
11 5. REGRESSION MODEL SPECIFICATION 
To test the hypotheses developed in section 2, we specified a multivariate regression 
model. Table 3 gives an overview of the dependent variable as well as explanatory 
variables together with the expected signs of the coefficients. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In the model the quality of the financial statements (FSQi) of a client firm, i, is 
related to determinants of audit-firm quality. Note that subscript i is used whenever a 
variable is a client variable, and subscript j is used in case of an audit-firm variable. 
FSQi is the dependent variable in the analysis and is measured as the compliance with 
the new disclosure standard as described in Section 2. If  a client firm complies, the 
dummy variable FSQ equals 1; it equals zero otherwise. The independent variables 
include  both test  and control  variables.  Viable  determinants  of audit  quality  are 
included as test variables. Based on the results of the factor analysis, we identified the 
following variables that are representative for each factor: return on assets (factor 1), 
current ratio (factor 2), net cash over total assets (factor 5), the median size of the 
clients as well as the percentage of clients with works council (factor 3), and lastly the 
number of clients (factor 4). Two remarks are in order here. First, with respect to the 
fourth factor we could have included PSIZE.i only, but we believe that PCOUNCIL.; 
contains incremental information as it draws special attention to an additional task the 
statutory auditor has in a firm with a works council. Second, to assess the joint impact 
of both  the  number  and the  size  of the  clients  in a  portfolio,  we  introduced an 
interaction  variable  between  these  two  variables.  We  predict  that  the  positive 
12 association between FSQ and the number of clients in an audit firm's portfolio will be 
stronger at higher levels of median client size. 
Several variables were included to control for other elements that affect the 
quality of the financial statements. Two control variables relate to the auditor-client 
relationship.  First,  the  aUdit-report  type  is  included  (REPORTj).  This  variable  is 
representative of an auditor's perception of a client fIrm's overall financial condition. 
When an auditor decides to issue a non-clean audit report for going-concern reasons, 
he has doubts about the going concern of his client. In such a situation it is reasonable 
to  expect that  the  auditor be more likely to insist  on the  application  of the  new 
standard. Second, a variable is introduced that measures the importance of the client in 
the  portfolio  of the  audit  firm.  The more  important  a  client to  that  audit fInn's 
turnover, the more likely that the auditor's independence be tempted. As audit fee data 
are not publicly available in Belgium, we use the relative size of a client as control 
variable (RELSIZEj). 
Another type of control variables relates to the financial performance of the 
client finn. The literature on accounting disclosure (see for example Lev and Penman 
1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993) reports evidence supportive of compliance with new 
accounting  standards  by better performing  fIrms  to  signal  this  good  news.  Non-
complying fIrms may try to cover up instead of disclosing bad news (i.e. that the going 
concern  valuation  basis can  no  longer be  held).  Variables  capturing  the  fInancial 
condition of client finns are:  the quick ratio (QUICKj), return on assets (ROAj), the 
existence of operational profIts  (OPERATIONAL),  the  level  of retained earnings 
(LTPROFi) and the short-term debt repayment capacity of the client fIrm (REP  A  Yi). 
13 Finally we include the client fIrm's size as a control variable, as large fIrms are 
believed  to  disclose  more  information  to  the  market,  because  the  chance  of one 
interested party discovering a breach and announcing it in the media is greater (S'IZEi). 
6. SAMPLE SELECTION 
Given the independent variables introduced in the previous section, we had to collect 
both individual  audit-client information  (i)  and audit-ftrm portfolio information  G) 
(which is an aggregation of all audit-client information per audit ftrm). To select our 
sample fIrms we used the BNE-database. As the new disclosure standard only applies 
to 1) fIrms in fInancial difficulties, and 2) financial statements published after January 
1, 1997, the population was limited to firms in financial difficulties with a year ending 
on December 31st 1997.4849 such companies were identified based on 1997 financial 
statements. Next, all firms that did not appoint an independent auditor were excluded 
from  the  sample.  This reduced our population to 3846 ftrms.  As  the notes  to  the 
financial  statements as  well  as  the audit report are not electronically available, but 
need  to  be  purchased  from  the  Belgian  National  Bank,  it  was  economically not 
feasible to include all these firms into our analysis. Therefore a random sample of 250 
companies from this population was drawn for which we purchased audit reports and 
notes. As some of the acquired information was not provided, our sample was reduced 
to 237 firms. 
From analysing the disclosure practices of the 237 companies in the sample, 
we were able to distinguish three types of  client firms: 1) companies that adopt going-
concern  based  valuation  but  do  not  apply  the  new  disclosure  requirement,  2) 
14 companies  that  adopt  going-concern  based  valuation  and  that  did  apply  the  new 
disclosure requirement, and 3) companies that announce liquidation and adapt their 
valuation  methods  accordingly.  For the  purpose  of this  paper,  the  third  group  is 
irrelevant  and  hence  eliminated  (15  firms).  Finally,  a number  of companies  were 
dropped  due  to  excessive  missing  values  in  their  financial  statements.  The  final 
sample contains 200 companies. 
In a next step,  we  linked  the information on the  sample firms  with the audit-firm 
portfolio measures developed in Section 4. To that end we merged the two databases. 
In total, there were 63 different audit firms auditing our 200 sample firms. The results 
of the analysis  using the financial  statement information  of the  200 firms  and the 
audit-firm portfolio characteristics  of the  63  audit  firms  are  discussed in  the  next 
section. 
7. RESULTS 
Of the 200 companies included in the sample, 29% or 58 companies did not apply the 
new  disclosure  standard. To explain this,  we  ran  a multivariate logistic regression. 
Before we discuss the results, we comment on some descriptive statistics of the client 
portfolios of the 63 audit firms and the 200 individual sample firms. 
Descriptive statistics 
These descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
15 All big 6 firms and 57 non-big 6 ftrms were included in the sample. The big 6 firms 
had more clients (8,530)  than  the non-big 6 ftrms  (6,916).  The average number of 
clients per audit firm is 1,422 for big 6 firms and 121 for non-big 6 ftrms.  Note that 
this difference is highly signiftcant (p =  0.0001, Wilcoxon test). The average size of 
the  big  6  clients  (181,170,000  BEF)  is  signiftcantly larger than  non-big  6  clients 
(143,485,000 BEF), and the presence of a works council is also more likely for big 6 
clients  (p  = 0.0001).  The  descriptive  statistics  also  show  that  the  new  disclosure 
standard is not a marginal phenomenon as it applies to 41.56% of the clients of big 6 
ftrms and 38.35% of the non-big 6 clients. 
The average audit-firm portfolio is ftnancially healthy, as the average portfolio 
return on assets  (pROAj) is  14.2%, current ratio is  larger than  1 (as  derived from 
PCURRENTj), and net cash position (pCASHj) is positive. Comparison of the average 
audit-ftrm  portfolio  characteristics  between  big  6  and  non-big  6  ftrms  shows 
signiftcant  differences.  Portfolios  of big 6  ftrms  are  signiftcantly more  profttable 
(pROAj, p =  0.0001), have a higher level of short-term debt relative to the current 
assets (pCURRENTj, p =  0.0001), but the net cash position indicates that they are less 
dependent  on  bank debt  (pCASHj, p =  0.0469).  These  results  indicate  that either 
clients choose their auditor selectively or that audit firms screen their customers. 
As to the ftnancial characteristics of the 200 sample firms, it is obvious that the 
two criteria used to  deftne ftrms  in difficulties  are  clearly reflected in the  data:  on 
average, firms have a negative long term profttability (LTPROFi, -0.266) as well as a 
16 negative ROA (-0.020).  The mean liquidity ratio  (QUICKj,  1.590) and short-term 
repayment position (STREP  A  Yj, 0.540) are good. 
Multivariate analysis 
The results of this analysis can be found in Table 5. As the model's chi-square statistic 
is highly significant (p =  0.0002) and the R2 equals 21.97%, all independent variables 
contribute to the explanation of the FSQi. From the correlation matrix in Appendix A 
it is clear that the results are not distorted by correlation problems. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We find  some  evidence  supportive  of our first  hypothesis.  The  net  cash 
position of the audit-firm portfolio affects (the auditor's enforcement of) compliance 
with the new disclosure regulation, as PCASHj is significant (p = 0.0161). Note that 
PCASHj classified as  a  leverage measure in the factor analysis, and measures the 
short-term financial leverage of the audit-firm portfolio. The fact that only a portfolio 
leverage  measure and not a  liquidity or profitability measure is significant,  could 
illustrate that audit firms are mainly concerned about possible reactions of banks. As 
banks closely monitor the financial position of their clients, they are often the fIrSt to 
be  alerted  and call  for  bankruptcy.  Another explanation  could be that  financial 
problems have to be very severe before the audit firms demand compliance with the 
new disclosure standard. The result for PCASHj is not so unexpected, given the choice 
of our financial statement quality measure (see also Section 6) and the characteristics 
of the sample firms in the analysis, which are all relatively bad performers. However, 
not so much the type of portfolio characteristic found significant matters, but the fact 
17 that audit-firms do differ in enforcing compliance with standards and hence in quality 
depending on the median financial performance of their portfolio. 
We also report evidence that is supportive of our second hypothesis, namely 
that exposure to  reputation  damage  also has  an  impact on financial  statement and 
audit quality. Audit firms with more clients have more at stake and demand higher 
financial statement quality from their clients. The variable PCLlENTSj  (p =  0.0086) is 
highly significant. However, the median size of the clients in portfolio (pSIZEj) does 
not influence financial statement qUality. This indicates that client size does not affect 
the auditor's perception of reputation damage. However, the negative coefficient on 
the  interaction  term  (pCLIENTSj * PSIZEj)  shows  that  the  positive  association 
between FSQj and PCLIENTSj  (the number of clients) decreases at higher levels of 
median size (p =  0.0070), which is different from expected. This could be explained 
by the audit firm's concern to maintain larger clients that generate more income to the 
audit  firm.  Finally,  we  also  find  that  the  percentage  of firms  in  the  audit-firm 
portfolio with a works council (pCOUNCILj) has a positive significant effects on FSQ 
(p =  0.0078). 
As  to the  control  variables,  we  find  significant results  for  REPORTj  (p = 
0.0035),  LTPROFj,  (p =  0.0194),  OPERATION~, (p = 0.0466)  and ROA (p = 
0.0821).  The client is more  likely to  apply the  new  disclosure  standard  when  the 
auditor has doubts/concerns about the going concern status of the client firm, and as 
expected the financial health of the client firm influences financial statement qUality. 
Different from the audit portfolio characteristics, profitability and solvency but not 
liquidity matter at the individual firm level. The results  also show that auditors are 
18 independent as the size of the client firm i in the portfolio is irrelevant in explaining 
financial statement qUality. 
To confirm our statement that audit portfolio characteristics better proxy audit 
quality differentiation than the traditionally used  big 6/non-big 6 variable, we  also 
tested Model 2 (see Table 5) where the dichotomous big 6/non-big 6 variable is tested 
instead of the  audit-firm portfolio characteristics. As  the explanatory power of the 
model  (pseudo-R2) drops  dramatically to 0.108, it is  clear that audit-firm portfolio 
characteristics  better  capture  the  audit  quality  concept  than  the  big  6/non-big  6 
variable. Furthermore, the variable BIG6i is not significant, while there is little change 
in the results for the control variables. Given the results obtained from testing Model 
1,  we conclude that the BIG6i-variable is too rough  to  capture differences in  audit 
quality. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditionally, differences in audit quality are measured by distinguishing between big 
6 and non-big 6 audit firms. As this is a rough measure, the major objective of this 
paper is  the empirical refinement of determinants of audit quality.  Based on  prior 
theories about audit-firm incentives and reputation (DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993), we 
linked audit-firm portfolio characteristics to the incidence and the size of subsequent 
audit-firm reputation damage. We hypothesise that as the portfolio of an audit firm 1) 
is financially weaker, and 2 ) contains more, larger and highly visible clients, the audit 
firm will  supply higher  audit  quality,  which  results  in higher  financial  statement 
qUality.  We find some evidence supportive of both hypotheses. First, the short-term 
19 leverage of an audit fIrm's portfolio seems to matter, as we fInd evidence that suggests 
that the  lower the median  value  of net cash position  of a portfolio  is,  the higher 
fInancial  statement quality and hence  audit quality.  Second, the size of the possible 
reputation  damage  is  also  important,  as  the  number  of clients  in  an  audit fIrm's 
portfolio positively affects fInancial statement and audit quality. 
From this  study it is clear that not all  the hypothesised audit-fIrm portfolio 
characteristics affect audit quality. Indeed, the results are to be seen in the context of 
the  measure  of fInancial  statement quality that  we  chose,  namely the  adoption  by 
client finns of a disclosure standard. However, we believe that not so much the type of 
the signifIcant portfolio characteristic matters, but the fact that audit-firms do differ in 
terms of audit qUality depending on the fInancial performance of the clients in their 
portfolio. Our suggestion for future research is  to further examine the influence of 
audit-fIrm  portfolio characteristics  on  fInancial  statement quality in  other fInancial 
reporting contexts using alternative measures for fInancial statement qUality. 
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NA TABLE 1: PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS (ALL VARIABLES ARE DEFINED AT PORTFOLIO LEVEL) 
Variables  Maan 
PCURRENTJ  median current ratio  1.4603 
PQUICI<j  median quick ratio  1.2133 
PCASHj  median value for (net casMota/ assets)  0.0217 
PROAj  medianROA  0.0322 
PROEj  median ROE  0.0602 
PLEVERAGEj  median leverage  2.0563 
PAUTOj  mecflBll value for (reseNes+ratained earnings / total assets)  0.0738 
PINDEPj  median value for (equ/lyltotal assets)  0.3119 
PSTREPAYj  median value for (cash Row  / short tenn debt)"'  0.0772 
PDIFFICj  relative number of cliants 7n difficulties'  40.9067 
PTOTALj  total sum of  all assets of  all clients  187180000 
PSIZEj  median amount of client's total assets  161304.3 
PEMPLOYJ  median number of client's employees  54.2475 
PCOUNCllj  relative number of  cllants with a worlcers' council  8.9972 
PCLlENTSj  total number of clients  122.1091 
24 TABLE 2: ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (LOADING) FOR A FIVE-FACTOR SOLUTION (N=165f 
Variables  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4  Factor 5 
PROFITABILITY  LIQUIDITY  VISIBILITY  PORTFOLIO  LEVERAGE  VOLUME 
PQUICK  -0.0783  0.9845  -0.0529  -0.0217  -0.0457 
PACID  -0.0929  0.9811  -0.0463  -0.0048  -0.0655 
PCASH  0.5633  0.0312  -0.0661  0.0292  -0.6043 
PROA  0.7408  -0.0145  -0.0392  0.1016  -0.0030 
PROE  -0.2224  -0.0073  0.4836  -0.0727  -0.1286 
PLEVERAGE  0.0308  -0.0573  -o.1n8  0.0524  0.8020 
PSELF  0.7916  -0.1898  -0.1282  -0.1300  -0.0110 
PINDEP  0.6034  0.4084  -0.2385  -0.0458  -0.3387 
PCF  0.1228  -0.0872  0.0275  -0.2655  0.3507 
PDIFFIC  -0.7324  0.1438  -0.1001  -0.0099  -0.4127 
PTOTAL  0.0283  -0.0160  0.1227  0.9547  -0.0112 
PSIZE  -0.0924  -0.0487  O.84n  -0.0023  0.1471 
PEMPLOY  0.1211  -0.0020  0.6923  0.1997  0.0282 
PCOUNCIL  -0.0543  -0.1457  0.7295  0.0582  -0.4798 
PCLlENTS  0.0184  -0.0496  0.0262  0.9565  -0.0203 
Variance explained by each factor  18.4000  16.7600  14.7500  11.7100  8.2700 
(percentage) 
Cumulative variance explained by 5 factors:  69.89 
(percentage) 
• Rotation method: Varirnax 
25 TABLE 3: MODEL FOR EXPLAINING FSQ (FINANCIAL STATEMENT QUAUTY) 
Hypotheses and  explanatory variables  Expected 
sign 
Del2§.ndent variable 
FSQi  dummy, which equals 1 if  a firm i applies the 
new standard and explains its valuation methods; 
zero otherwise 
Indel2§.ndent test vari€Jbles 
HI: Chance ora repuliltion loss 
PROAj  median ROA of  the entire client portfolio of  an  -
audit firmj 
PCURRENTj  median current ratio of  the entire client portfolio  -
of  an audit firm j 
PCASH.i  median value for (net cashltotal assets) of  the  -
entire client portfolio of  an audit firm j 
H2: Cost o(a repuliltion loss 
PCLIENTSj  total number of  clients in the portfolio of  firmj  + 
PSIZEj  size of  the median client in the portfolio of  j  + 
(total assets) 
PCLIENTSj*  PSIZEj  The interaction variable between total number of  + 
clients and the size of  the median client in the 
portfolio 
PCOUNCILj  percentage of  client firms of  an auditor j with a  + 
works council (%) 
Indel2§.ndent control variables 
REPORTj  a dummy, which equals 1 if  the company does  + 
not receive an unqualified report without 
explanatory paragraph for going concern 
problems; zero otherwise. 
RELSIZE;j  ratio of  total assets of  company i to the sum of  -
total assets of  all clients of  audit firmj, 
expressed as a percentage 
SIZE;  natural logarithm of  the total assets of sample  + 
firmi 
QUICK;  ratio of  (accounts receivable >1 year + cash) to  + 
short term debt for company i 
ROA;  return on assets for company i  + 
OPERATIONAL;  a dummy which equals 1 if company i has a  + 
positive result from operations 
LTPROFj  Ratio of  (reserves + retained earnings) to the  + 
total assets for company I 
STREPAYj  Inverse ratio of  cash flow to short term debt  -
expiring within one year for company i 
26 TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
MEAN  BIG 6 firms  Non-big 6 firms  <p 
~umber  of audit firms  - 6  57  -
otal number of  8530  6919  -
clients 
ercentage of client  40.10%  41.56%  38.35%  -
irms in difficulties 
PROAj  0.037  0.0404  0.033  0.0001  ** 
PCURRENTj  1.202  1.184  1.22  0.0001  ** 
PCASHj  0.024  0.027  0.021  0.0469  ** 
PCLlENTSj  889  1568  196  0.0001  ** 
PSIZEj  162617  181170  143485  0.0001  ** 
PCOUNCllj  11.6  13.724  9.543  0.0001  .. 
REPORT;  0.321  0.364  0.278  0.2023 
RELSIZEij  1.5  0.071  3.021  0.0001  *. 
SIZE;  12.082  12.245  11.916  0.135 
QUICKI  1.59  1.679  1.5  0.3392 
ROAi  -0.02  -0.031  -0.008  0.1544 
OPERATIONAl.;  0.429  0.384  0.474  0.2028 
LTPROFI  -0.266  -0.265  -0.266  0.2683 
STREPAYI  0.54  0.703  0.3n  0.0593  . 
# Note that there were 2953 client companies that belonged to both sub-samples since they 
were audited by two audit firms: a big 6 as well as by a Non-big 6 audit fIrm. Taken together, 
the 63 audit fIrms perform audits on 12,496 different client fIrms. 
27 TABLE 5: RESULTS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION LINKING FSQ AND AUDIT PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS 
FSQI  = Bo + B/ PROAj + Bz PCURREN1j + BJ PCASllj + B4 PCUENTSj+ B5 PSlZEj  + B6(PCUENTSj*PSlZEj) +B7 PCOUNC14 + B8 REPORT,  + B9RELSlZEy + 
B/o SIZE, + B11 QUICK, + B/z ROA, + Bu OPERA710NAL, + Bu LTPROF, + B15 STREPAY, + e; 
MOD§L1  MODEL 2 
Variable  Parameter  Standard  Wald  p<  Parameter  Standard  Wald  p< 
Estimate  Error  Chl-Squara  Estlmala  Error  Chi-Square 
INTERCEPT  -4.8585  3.8705  1.5757  0.2094  0.7626  1.2105  0.3969  0.5287 
PROAJ  (FACTOR 1)  25.1710  25.7036  0.9590  0.3274 
PCURREN1j  (FACTOR2)  2.7531  2.5796  1.1389  0.2859 
PCASHj  (FACTOR&)  -23.3126  9.6851  5.7939  0.0161 
PCLlENTSj  (FACTOR 4)  0.00352  0.00134  6.9096  0.0096 
PSIZEj  (FACTOR3)  1.991E'()6  8.026E.()6  0.0615  0.8041 
PCLlENTSj • PSIZEj  -2.34E.()8  8.68E.()9  7.2630  0.0070 
PCOUNCI4  (FACTOR3)  0.1591  0.0596  7.0874  0.0078 
BIGB,  0.1279  0.3517  0.1323  0.7161 
REPORT,  1.3919  0.4762  8.5445  0.0035  1.0624  0.4233  8.5406  0.0105 
RELSIZE,  .().on3  0.0510  2.3003  0.1294  '().0134  0.0194  0.4795  0.4896 
SIZEJ  0.0517  0.1005  0.2643  0.6072  0.0170  0.0959  0.0.0314  0.8593 
QUICK,  0.1253  0.1045  1.4372  0.2306  0.1035  0.0956  0.1720  0.2790 
ROA,  2.9086  1.6730  3.0227  0.0621  2.6368  1.6017  3.1368  0.0765 
OPERATIONAL,  .().B255  0.4148  3.9600  0.0466  -0.6985  0.3737  3.4930  0.0616 
LTPROF,  0.7596  0.3248  5.4694  0.0194  0.5326  0.3108  4.1439  0.0418 
S7HEPAY!  0.00501  0.0533  0.0088  0.9252  0.0329  0.0500  0.4323  0.5109 
Model-£'  41.870··  Model-£'  22.700 •• 
P88udo-R"  0.22  Pseudo-R"  0.108 
The dependent variable, FSC"  equals 1 If the new reporting requirement is applied, 0 otherwise. Indapendent variables are defined In table I. 
., **=  p-value < .10, .05, respectively 
28 APPENDIX A: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PROAt  PCURRENTj  PCASHj  PCLlENTS/  PSIZEJ  PCOUNCIl;  REPORT,  RELSIZE,  SIZE,  QU/CKi  ROA,  OPERATIONAL,  LTPROFj  STREPA~ 
ROAt  1  0.29011  0.216flll  0.3030<1  -O.2363E  -O.22B5'I  -0.06401  -0.63878  -0.0375(1  0.09281  0.03597  0.13273  -O.0954E  0.02065 
If'CURRENTj  1  0.29271  -O.1299~  -0.4628  -0.3793i  -0.1120{  -0.44341  -O.0225E  0.0682:  -0.00784  0.011~  -O.0431~  -0.12213 
fC,4SH/  1  0.0893i  0.1721  0.48811  0.03441  O.049OC  0.0253  0.0085  -0.03001  -O.0654E  0.03721  -0.06786 
'fCUENTS/  1  0.14561  0.17061  0.1013i  -0.19691  0.05131  0.02121  -0.0205  -0.0265  0.0004E  0.080~ 
SIZEJ  1  0.76781  0.1170<1  0.52561:  0.0759'  -0.00051  -O.Ol~  -0.11651  -0.0349  0.0051 
PCOUNCI'-I  1  0.08371  0.6154  0.04901  0.0251  -O.O3~  -O.1351E  -O.032E  0.02281 
REPORT,  1  0.12731  -0.0127  -0.07221  -0.0494:  -0.11031  0.0861:  O.0845g 
f/ELSIZE,  1  0.03941  -0.03651  -0.02851  -0.0830  O.OlsO:!  -O.0241~ 
~JZE,  1  -O.21D2l  0.00041  -0.0083<  0.16921  0.026l 
~CKi  1  O.~  -O.l223E  -O.6858f  -O.029~ 
f'IDA,  1  0.2BD2E  0.on2!  -O.0281~ 
[OPERA TlONAL,  1  0.0537~  -O.0982~ 
TPROFj  1  -0.05321 
ISTREPAYi  1 
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